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RECENT CASE NOTES
mitted in the dissenting opinion. The dissenting justices, however, say
that sometimes monopolization is desirable and that it may both improve
the service rendered and reduce the cost. They point out the well estab-
lished law of economics that mass production cheapens the cost of manu-
facture and improves the methods of distribution. The point made in the
dissenting opinion is clearly well taken. There is no incongruity in saying
that a business may be controlled because of its monopolistic tendency and
then saying that the control may take the form of further monopolization.
The court merely looks into the monopolistic character of the business to
determine whether or not it falls within that class which is so "affected with
the public interest" that its regulation is necessary for the public welfare.
If the business is of such a nature, there is no reason why legislation can
not be valid which will tend to further monopolize it, if the public interest
can best be served by so doing. It seems, then, that we must conclude that
such regulation may be within the limits of the police power. W. H. H.
REAL PROPERTY-BOUNDARIES--APPORTIONMENT OF ExcEss OR DE-
FICIENCY-The defendants bought a lot and erected thereon a brick business
building. The plaintiff, who owns the north 40 feet of the lot which adjoins
the defendant's lot on the south, claims that the building extends over upon
his lot a distance of 4% inches, and brought an action for damages and
possession and to quiet title. The tier of seven lots on the west side of
Meridian street, in which the lots of the parties are included, is shown by
the plat to have a distance of 367.4 feet along the street. The actual dis-
tance, however, is 366 feet, being short 1.4 feet. Along the alley line, the
shortage is 1 foot. Two of the seven lots are irregular in shape, one of
the two being the plaintiff's lot. The defendant's lot is regular in shape
and is the second from the north end of the tier. The end lot has a width
of 50 feet according to the plot and is occupied by buildings extending the
full 50 feet. The width of the defendant's lot is 50 feet, according to the
plat, and the foundation of the defendant's store building is 49.64 feet wide,
extending from the end lot. It follows that if the shortage is not absorbed
in the irregular shaped lots, the dimensions of which are stated on the plat,
or elsewhere, and if a proportionate part of the shortage must be taken
from all lots in the tier, including the defendant's lot, then the defendant's
south wall is over four inches south of their property line, unless the limits
have been otherwise fixed by adverse possession or in some other manner.
The plaintiff is in possession of all the land called for in his deed and has
never been called upon to give up any part of the land so held. No owners
of lots other than the owners of the two lots in question have been made
parties to this action. Held, that the plaintiff cannot recover under the
rule of apportionment as no other owners of lots in the tier have been
joined. The court adds that there is a probability that the defendants have
gained title to the strip by adverse possession.'
Indiana seems to have adopted the rule as to government sections that
the interior lots in fractional sections shall be made to contain the legal
number of acres, on an original survey, and that any deficiency shall be
1IGelger v. UlM, Supreme Court of Indiana, March 11, 1932, 180 N. E. 10.
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charged against the outer lot.2 However, this rule does not apply where
the original surveys are found to be erroneous or the original corners and
lines are wholly lost.S
The general rule of apportionment is that where a tract of land is sub-
divided and is subsequently found to contain either more or less than the
aggregate amount called for in the surveys of the tracts within it, the
proper course is to apportion the excess or deficiency among the several
tracts.4 The reason for the rule is that there is more probability of error
in measuring a short one.5 In operation, the rule has the effect of appor-
tioning the excess or deficiency in any line among the several lots in
amounts based upon the proportion the length or width of the lot bears to
the length or width of the whole tract.6
Where the parties claim under separate deeds from the same grantor,
the rule requiring the apportionment of the excess or deficiency can be
applied only where the land is conveyed with reference to a plan, or where
there is some declaration in the deeds indicating a purpose to divide the
land in some definite proportion, and where there is no other guide to
determine the location of the respective lots.7 In all other cases a different
rule is applied, to the effect that any excess in the quantity of the land
must go to the last grantee, and that any deficiency must be borne by him.8
The general rule is subject to an exception where, in subdividing a line
or space, a surveyor declares the dimensions which he has given to each
of the subdivisions except the last, and there leaves an irregular space
without designating its dimensions, in which case he will be presumed to
have thrown the remainder, much or little, into that irregular and un-
measured portion; and any discrepancy in the apparent but undeclared
width of such portion does not serve to contradict the declaration of the
original plat as to the width of the other lots.9 In its opinion, the court in
the principal case seemed to regard the general rule of apportionment and
the above qualification or exception to the rule as the law in Indiana.
The defendants contended that where a tract is subdivided into lots of
regular dimensions and an irregular lot or lots, all with dimensions specified
on the plat, and a deficiency or excess subsequently appears, the deficiency
or excess must fall on or be assigned to the irregular tract or tracts, re-
gardless of the dimensions stated on the plat. Cases in support of this
contention proceed upon the ground that the owner must have intended
the regular lots to be uniform and the irregular tract to be a remnant.10
The authorities are divided on this point, however, some cases holding that
2Keeshing v. Truitt (1868). 30 Ind. 306; Groover v. Paddock (1882), 84 Ind.
244; see also Bailey v. Chamberlin (1863), 20 Ind. 33.
8 Gaylor v. Luzadder (1893), 137 Ind. 319, 36 N. E1. 909, 45 Am. St. Rep. 183.
'Bailey v. Chamberlin (1863), 20 Ind. 33; Bennett v. Simon, (1899), 152 Ind.
490, 53 N. E. 649. See 9 C. S. 295.
OPereles V. Gross (1905), 126 Wis. 122, 105 N. W. 217, 110 Am. St. Rep. 901.
6Newcomb v. Lewis (1871), 31 Iowa 488.
See 4 R. C. L. 115.
8 Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1276, note.
9Perele8 vu. Gross (1905), 126 Wis. 122, 105 N. W. 217; Toudouze v. Keller
(1909), Tex. Civ. App., 118 S. W. 185.
"Barrett -. Perkins (1911), 113 Minn. 480, 130 N. W. 67; Baldwin v. Shannon
(1881), 43 N. J. L. 596.
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the irregular lots should not bear the whole deficiency, but that it should
be apportioned.'1 In each of the latter cases there were facts from which
it might appear that the irregular lot was originally intended as a remnant,
though given dimensions, but the court gave more weight to the presumption
that the variance arose from a defective survey of the whole line, and not
of any part. There was apparently no Indiana decision upon which either
party could base his contentions and the court in the principal case did not
decide the question, it being unnecessary for a determination of the rights
of the parties. 0. M. B.
1Newcomb v. Lewi8 (1871), 31 Iowa 488; Wyatt v. Savage (1834), 11 Me. 429.
